Psikhologicheskie Issledovaniya • ISSN 2075-7999
peer-reviewed • open access journal


2020 Vol. 13 Issue 72

Stanovich K. Overcoming Miserly Processing: Detection, Override, and Mindware

Full text in Russian: Станович К. Преодолевая экономию когнитивной обработки: распознавание, подавление и способы мышления

University of Toronto, Toronto, Canada

About author
Suggested citation

Errors in heuristics and biases tasks can derive from different reasons. In order to understand those errors, this chapter uncovers three mental characteristics required for rational thinking: conflict detection, override and mindware. Failures in their processing can be divided in two categories – problems with miserly processing and problems with mindware. Heuristics and biases tasks differently depend on conflict detection, override and mindware, which allows identifying the underlying cause of an error if one occurred. Taxonomy of thinking errors and description of heuristics and biases tasks to assess those are described.

Keywords: rational thinking, heuristics and biases tasks, thinking errors, dual-process theory, mindware.

Full text in Russian >>


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Received 30 July 2020. Date of publication: 28 August 2020.

About author

Keith E. Stanovich. Professor Emeritus of Applied Psychology and Human Development. University of Toronto. 252 Bloor Street West. Toronto, Ontario  M5S 1V6  CANADA
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Suggested citation

Stanovich K. Overcoming Miserly Processing: Detection, Override, and Mindware. Psikhologicheskie Issledovaniya, 2020, Vol. 13, No. 72, p. 7. (in Russian, abstr. in English).

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