The problem of animal intelligence in the context of structural-integrative and differential-integrative approaches

Abstract

The article is devoted to the problem of animal intelligence in the context of current empirical evidence of the presence of intellectual abilities not only in warm-blooded vertebrates but also in animals of many other taxonomic groups. The following thesis is substantiated: intelligence considered as an integrator of the animal cognitive sphere (within the frames of structural-integrative and differential-integrative approaches) is an essential part of the organization of any level of mental development, from the very moment of genesis occurrence of the relevant form of reflection. In this case, certain structures of innate and acquired experience (instincts and skills) are included in intelligence as its individual elements. Moreover, arguments supporting that thinking as a way of integration of animal intelligence at early stages of the evolution of the psyche exists in a form of homogeneous unity with other mental processes (particularly with perception and sensation) are brought forward. It is concluded that in order to understand the specific nature of animal intelligence it is necessary to study not only animals’ special cognitive abilities but also the particularity of cognitive structures that underlie this abilities.