Что мы знаем об устройстве интуитивных теорий?

Курбан Курбанов; Владимир Спиридонов

doi:10.54359/ps.v16i90.1438

Авторы

Курбан Курбанов Российская академия народного хозяйства и государственной службы при Президенте Российской Федерации, Москва, Россия
Владимир Спиридонов Российская академия народного хозяйства и государственной службы при Президенте Российской Федерации, Москва, Россия

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.54359/ps.v16i90.1438

Ключевые слова:

ментальные модели, интуитивные теории, обыденное познание, мышление

Аннотация

Представлен обзор активно развивающейся области когнитивных исследований, изучающей устойчивые формы представлений – интуитивных теорий – различных предметов и явлений. Проводится анализ основных подходов, представленных в этой области: «теории теории» (the theory theory) и «знания по частям» (knowledge-in-pieces). Обсуждается развитие моделей онтогенеза представлений о различных явлениях действительности в рамках теории концептуальных изменений. Представлены экспериментальные аргументы как в пользу, так и против отдельных подходов. Рассматривается как актуальное положение дел, так и возможные дальнейшие направления работ.

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Авторы

Курбан Курбанов, Российская академия народного хозяйства и государственной службы при Президенте Российской Федерации, Москва, Россия

Аспирант, младший научный сотрудник центра перспективных исследований, факультет психологии, институт общественных наук, Российская академия народного хозяйства и государственной службы при Президенте РФ, пр. Вернадского, 82, корп. 2, 119571 Москва, Россия.

Владимир Спиридонов, Российская академия народного хозяйства и государственной службы при Президенте Российской Федерации, Москва, Россия

Доктор психологических наук, профессор, заведующий научно-исследовательской лабораторией когнитивных исследований, факультет психологии, институт общественных наук, Российская академия народного хозяйства и государственной службы при Президенте РФ, пр. Вернадского, 82, корп. 2, 119571 Москва, Россия.

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